Difference between revisions of "When will the war in Ukraine end And 9 more questions about Russias invasion NPR"

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<p>Almost three months on, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. Russia has suffered a series of significant military setbacks that make any victory for them look a much more distant and difficult prospect – but a swift win for Ukraine doesn’t look likely either. As Ukrainian forces continued to hold off Russian advances on Kyiv, President Biden traveled to Brussels on Wednesday for an emergency meeting with other NATO leaders to discuss how to respond to Russia’s assault and help the 3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country.</p><br /><br /><br /><br /><p>The first - which would be the most optimistic from Kyiv’s perspective - is that Ukrainian forces successfully move towards Mariupol on the Black Sea coast, cutting off Russian forces from the southern part of the country. The move “would also put Crimea at risk and then potentially we could see a collapse of Russian forces and effectively Ukraine could win,” he said. There was, for example, a thread of continuity between the first and second world wars. To be sure, a lot happened in the intervening years that could have changed the direction of what followed.</p><br /><br /><h2>The First Time the Nazis Tried to Take Power</h2><br /><br /><p>Instead, over the past year Ukrainian forces have consistently and successfully pushed back the invading troops. As long as there is no direct conflict between Russia and Nato then there is no reason for this crisis, bad as it is, to descend into a full-scale world war. They are feeling distinctly nervous that Russian forces might not stop at Ukraine and instead use some pretext to "come to the aid" of the ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics and invade.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>As long as Russia's potential invasion force remains massed on the borders then even the bustling Ukrainian capital Kyiv, and other cities, will not be safe from attack.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>It would receive a guarantee that the water canals flowing southward to that peninsula from the city of Kherson, which would revert to Ukrainian control, would never again be blocked.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>It is in a fight for its survival and understands what Russia will do if it stops.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Massive cyber-attacks sweep across Ukraine, targeting key national infrastructure.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Eight human rights activists have been given long prison sentences for anti-government protests in Turkey.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>In this scenario, the strategists noted, Russia would realize it has "once again fought an unwinnable war, the proverbial quagmire that has trapped many powerful states through history." There's of course the possibility that a Ukrainian fightback doesn't pose a significant challenge to Russian forces that remain in Ukraine — after all, thousands of fighters are civilians who taken up arms and have been hastily trained. There are [https://gilliam-albrechtsen-4.technetbloggers.de/ukraine-invasion-russians-feel-the-pain-of-international-sanctions-1706865880 https://gilliam-albrechtsen-4.technetbloggers.de/ukraine-invasion-russians-feel-the-pain-of-international-sanctions-1706865880] over who could lead a loyalist regime in Ukraine, one that could resemble that of Belarus' Alexander Lukashenko.</p><br /><br /><h3>How Will the War in Ukraine End?</h3><br /><br /><p>However, what was not apparent to Russia until the fighting began is that the Ukrainian people are far more willing to fight than they anticipated. According to this approach, wars will end when the problem that caused the war is resolved by fighting on the battlefield. How long the fighting will last and the form it takes depends on the extent and type of the problem. When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, I was easing my way into a new job and in the throes of the teaching year. I spend most of my day poring over multiple newspapers, magazines, blogs, and the Twitter feeds of various military mavens, a few of whom have been catapulted by the war from obscurity to a modicum of fame.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Less than two weeks into Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the country's people and armed forces continue to mount a staunch — and undeniably brave — resistance against Russian forces.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The U.S. is also training about 100 Ukrainians on the Patriot anti-missile system in Oklahoma.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>They also promised to provide assistance to Ukraine if it "should become a victim of an act of aggression".</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Ukraine, meanwhile, would need years of western support to ensure its eastern border remains stable.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>As long as there is no direct conflict between Russia and Nato then there is no reason for this crisis, bad as it is, to descend into a full-scale world war.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>In the United States, he noted, everything from industrial policy to diplomatic and military strategy to domestic politics similarly will need to be refashioned for this new conflict. One year ago, Russia launched a war that many never expected it to wage and assumed it would quickly win against a cowed Ukraine and its allies. For a war that has defied expectations, those questions might seem impossible to answer.</p><br /><br /><br /><br /><p>One year into the conflict, here are some of your questions about the war answered. Britain is not the only country to be punishing Russia with sanctions - the US has gone further and Germany, for example, has now postponed giving the green light to the massive Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia - but the UK is in the forefront of pushing for penalties. Often described as coldly calculating, like the chess player and judo fighter that he is, his speech on Monday resembled more that of an angry dictator than a shrewd strategist. Let's not forget that Russia and America have, between them, over 8,000 deployable nuclear warheads so the stakes here are stratospherically high.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The most likely end to the violence will not be an end to the war at all, but a ceasefire, says Greene.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>He agreed to a House rules change that would allow any member to initiate a vote to remove him as speaker, forcing him to tread carefully even on issues that enjoy majority Republican support — such as Ukraine assistance.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The war, which ended with the Chechen capital razed to the ground and Chechen resistance largely stamped out, left a lasting imprint on Putin’s approach to regions seeking to break away from Russian influence, according to analysts.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Phillips P OBrien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St Andrews, wrote in an analysis piece&nbsp;that the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House could see the US "neuter" the Western military alliance.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul>
+
<p>This would be a defensive pact, but not a commitment to take direct part in any future offensive operations Ukraine might choose to undertake. The obvious strategy is to try to break the road and rail corridor linking Russia proper to occupied Crimea, so cutting off the peninsula from its hinterland, with an attack towards Melitopol or Berdansk. Combine that with another attack on the now repaired 12-mile (19km) Kerch Bridge to the Russian mainland and Crimea would be increasingly isolated and vulnerable. However, it is hard to imagine Russia striking very far west, given the painfully slow advance around Bakhmut and the catastrophic attempt to capture Vuhledar. Currently, western intelligence estimates Russia is taking 1,000 casualties a day.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>That conflict, also between neighbours, was fundamentally fought over territory and resources.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The latter might be deterred in part by NATO nuclear maneuvers or by Chinese, Indian, or other international opposition.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>“People think it’s going to be over quickly, but, unfortunately, war doesn’t work like that,” he said.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>There were sporadic protests across the nation, and these threatened to grow in size.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>It did so over the entire length of the war from the seeming collapse of the Taliban in 2002 to U.S. withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan government and forces in 2021.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>As the UNDP data shown earlier indicates, Ukraine now must actively defend against sustained missile attacks on its economy and civil structure and against a Russia that seems willing to attack its civil population and wage the equivalent of political and economic warfare.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>Russia's defence budget has tripled since 2021 and will consume 30% of government spending next year. The US defence aid package is held hostage by what President Biden rightly labelled "petty politics" in Washington. And the future of the EU's economic aid is seemingly dependent on Hungary's incongruous stance. President Volodomyr Zelensky has admitted his country's spring offensive has not been the success he hoped. Balazs Orban, chief political aide to the prime minister, said Hungary sent a proposal to the EU over the weekend showing it was open to using the budget for the aid package if other "caveats" were added.</p><br /><br /><h2>After a year of war in Ukraine, all signs point to more misery with no end in sight</h2><br /><br /><p>While no one can provide definitive answers, academic research on war gives us some insights into how the conflict in Ukraine might unfold. Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior international and defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches a course on the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. If the ground freezes deep and long enough, Ukraine's army might conduct combined arms operations to push deeper into occupied areas. Even Crimea could be vulnerable if Ukrainians seized the rail hub of Melitopol.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Unnamed Indian government sources have suggested India wants to distance itself from Russia, according to Reuters news agency.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The United States and Europe would conduct rival arms races and military build-ups with Russia while in a state of political and economic confrontation and competing for influence on a global level.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>A wide variety of unclassified official statements and media reports show that NATO and member country military planners are focusing on the right priorities.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Russian forces are already trying to slow down tanks in Ukraine with mines, trenches, and pyramidical, concrete “dragon’s teeth,” a type of fortification not seen in combat since World War II.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>The recent arms donations — Kyiv still wants fighter aircraft and long-range tactical missiles — are predicated on the assumption they’ll force Moscow to end its invasion and begin negotiations because military costs are too high.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Recently, Ukrainian forces took back half the land in eastern and southern Ukraine, which Russians seized in the second invasion launched on February 24, including the only regional capital taken since then, Kherson.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>Although Putin attempted to build up a financial bulwark that would allow him to protect the interests of the oligarchs, the sanctions imposed by the west have undercut most of his efforts. Other strategic partners in Asia, the MENA region, and the rest of the world will see Ukraine as a test of U.S. capability beyond military terms. They will see the war as a test of U.S. capability to compete at a diplomatic and economic level. At least some will also see the war as a test of just how much the United States is focusing on China to the point where its commitments outside Taiwan and dealing with China have far less importance. This strategy also allows the United States to fully examine peace options, work with its allies to meet their concerns, and wait to push options forward when the time is right. It is also clear that even compromised real peace will be better for all sides than a bad war.</p><br /><br /><h3>Ukraine's gains</h3><br /><br /><p>This is partly because of the uncertainties surrounding the level of US and European support, a matter to which I will return in my conclusion. But it was largely because of the meagre returns from Ukraine’s intensive efforts to liberate more territory. Mr Danilov said they included security forces, officials and representatives of Russia's oligarchs, who believe that Mr Putin's decision to launch a full invasion of Ukraine in February last year has been a personal disaster for them as well as a threat to Russia.</p><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><p>Only aircraft deployed to protect energy facilities, or those carrying top Russian or foreign officials, will be allowed to fly with special permission in the designated zones, according to the Vedomosti daily newspaper. Unnamed Indian government sources have suggested India wants to distance itself from Russia, according to Reuters news agency. " [https://ambitious-camel-g3r4ks.mystrikingly.com/blog/how-will-russia-s-war-with-ukraine-end-here-are-5-possible-outcomes-60094602-7656-4808-8abb-0a68ee4d7aaf https://ambitious-camel-g3r4ks.mystrikingly.com/blog/how-will-russia-s-war-with-ukraine-end-here-are-5-possible-outcomes-60094602-7656-4808-8abb-0a68ee4d7aaf] and constructive dialogue is expected to improve relations between states," the Ukrainian president's office said on its official channel on the Telegram messaging app alongside a photo of Mr Szijjarto, Mr Kuleba and Mr Yermak. Mr Szijarto will be in the western Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba and presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak. Peter Szijjarto has arrived in Ukraine for talks with senior officials today.</p><br /><br /><br /><br /><p>Still, it’s an open question whether the U.S. will be able to indefinitely continue its current level of support, said Mark Cancian, a CSIS senior adviser who has studied the volumes of artillery used in the war. Also in the mix is a pledge from France to ship AMX-10 RC light, wheeled tanks. And its use carries with it the risk, again, of even greater involvement in the war by the U.S. But it could also, at least temporarily, halt the advance of the Ukrainian Army.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>But it was a reminder that Russian doctrine allows for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>But Russia under Putin has never ended its wars at the negotiating table; at best it has frozen them, keeping its options open.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Even if there was a sudden interest in peace negotiations these could well be played for time and propaganda effect without much expectation that they would lead to an agreement.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Like Stalin’s invasion of Finland in the Winter War of 1939, the Russian army is bogged down and bloodied by a much smaller, outgunned enemy.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>That said, there wasn't much of a political will for third countries to sanction Cuba at the time. It's possible today's situation with Russia might make such a policy more politically palatable if the U.S. attempted it again, though I can't find any serious proposal in the government to do just that. It is theoretically possible for the U.S. to sanction countries that maintain economic ties with Russia.</p><br /><br /><ul><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>But the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Celeste Wallander, warned at the hearing that the current funding level “does not preclude” the administration from needing to request more assistance before the end of September.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>To be sure, a lot happened in the intervening years that could have changed the direction of what followed.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Finally, there remains the specter that a desperate Kremlin might escalate the war, such as by direct attacks on supply and training bases in nearby NATO countries or even limited use of nuclear weapons.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br />  <br /><br /> <li>Mark Temnycky, a Ukrainian-American journalist and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center said that delays in 2023 allowed Russia to fortify positions in the south and east of Ukraine, regroup and re-strategize.</li><br /><br />  <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /></ul><br /><br /><p>It could prove the best chance to achieve the victory that Ukraine and the democratic world need soon, while making it both Putin- and Trump-proof. Some Ukrainian experts fear a pincer movement to encircle Donbas and the east from Sumy in the north and Velyka Novosilka in the south, allowing Russia to occupy most of the four Ukrainian provinces it has unilaterally claimed to have annexed. At this point, Russia could call for a ceasefire to retain what it has, and run a defensive campaign to consolidate its battered military. Professor Mark Edele — Hansen Professor in History at the University of Melbourne and author of a new book, Russia's War Against Ukraine — says there are five possible outcomes to the war. According to Die Welt newspaper, for example, Germany promised 100 Leopard tanks and has delivered 10; promised 357 reconnaissance drones and delivered 27; promised 20 transport vehicles and delivered none. Now that Yevgeny Prigozhin is presumed to have died in a plane crash, the fate of his lucrative paramilitary group hangs in the balance.</p><br /><br />

Revision as of 23:01, 13 February 2024

This would be a defensive pact, but not a commitment to take direct part in any future offensive operations Ukraine might choose to undertake. The obvious strategy is to try to break the road and rail corridor linking Russia proper to occupied Crimea, so cutting off the peninsula from its hinterland, with an attack towards Melitopol or Berdansk. Combine that with another attack on the now repaired 12-mile (19km) Kerch Bridge to the Russian mainland and Crimea would be increasingly isolated and vulnerable. However, it is hard to imagine Russia striking very far west, given the painfully slow advance around Bakhmut and the catastrophic attempt to capture Vuhledar. Currently, western intelligence estimates Russia is taking 1,000 casualties a day.











  • That conflict, also between neighbours, was fundamentally fought over territory and resources.








  • The latter might be deterred in part by NATO nuclear maneuvers or by Chinese, Indian, or other international opposition.








  • “People think it’s going to be over quickly, but, unfortunately, war doesn’t work like that,” he said.








  • There were sporadic protests across the nation, and these threatened to grow in size.








  • It did so over the entire length of the war from the seeming collapse of the Taliban in 2002 to U.S. withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan government and forces in 2021.








  • As the UNDP data shown earlier indicates, Ukraine now must actively defend against sustained missile attacks on its economy and civil structure and against a Russia that seems willing to attack its civil population and wage the equivalent of political and economic warfare.










Russia's defence budget has tripled since 2021 and will consume 30% of government spending next year. The US defence aid package is held hostage by what President Biden rightly labelled "petty politics" in Washington. And the future of the EU's economic aid is seemingly dependent on Hungary's incongruous stance. President Volodomyr Zelensky has admitted his country's spring offensive has not been the success he hoped. Balazs Orban, chief political aide to the prime minister, said Hungary sent a proposal to the EU over the weekend showing it was open to using the budget for the aid package if other "caveats" were added.



After a year of war in Ukraine, all signs point to more misery with no end in sight



While no one can provide definitive answers, academic research on war gives us some insights into how the conflict in Ukraine might unfold. Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior international and defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches a course on the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. If the ground freezes deep and long enough, Ukraine's army might conduct combined arms operations to push deeper into occupied areas. Even Crimea could be vulnerable if Ukrainians seized the rail hub of Melitopol.











  • Unnamed Indian government sources have suggested India wants to distance itself from Russia, according to Reuters news agency.








  • The United States and Europe would conduct rival arms races and military build-ups with Russia while in a state of political and economic confrontation and competing for influence on a global level.








  • A wide variety of unclassified official statements and media reports show that NATO and member country military planners are focusing on the right priorities.








  • Russian forces are already trying to slow down tanks in Ukraine with mines, trenches, and pyramidical, concrete “dragon’s teeth,” a type of fortification not seen in combat since World War II.








  • The recent arms donations — Kyiv still wants fighter aircraft and long-range tactical missiles — are predicated on the assumption they’ll force Moscow to end its invasion and begin negotiations because military costs are too high.








  • Recently, Ukrainian forces took back half the land in eastern and southern Ukraine, which Russians seized in the second invasion launched on February 24, including the only regional capital taken since then, Kherson.










Although Putin attempted to build up a financial bulwark that would allow him to protect the interests of the oligarchs, the sanctions imposed by the west have undercut most of his efforts. Other strategic partners in Asia, the MENA region, and the rest of the world will see Ukraine as a test of U.S. capability beyond military terms. They will see the war as a test of U.S. capability to compete at a diplomatic and economic level. At least some will also see the war as a test of just how much the United States is focusing on China to the point where its commitments outside Taiwan and dealing with China have far less importance. This strategy also allows the United States to fully examine peace options, work with its allies to meet their concerns, and wait to push options forward when the time is right. It is also clear that even compromised real peace will be better for all sides than a bad war.



Ukraine's gains



This is partly because of the uncertainties surrounding the level of US and European support, a matter to which I will return in my conclusion. But it was largely because of the meagre returns from Ukraine’s intensive efforts to liberate more territory. Mr Danilov said they included security forces, officials and representatives of Russia's oligarchs, who believe that Mr Putin's decision to launch a full invasion of Ukraine in February last year has been a personal disaster for them as well as a threat to Russia.







Only aircraft deployed to protect energy facilities, or those carrying top Russian or foreign officials, will be allowed to fly with special permission in the designated zones, according to the Vedomosti daily newspaper. Unnamed Indian government sources have suggested India wants to distance itself from Russia, according to Reuters news agency. " https://ambitious-camel-g3r4ks.mystrikingly.com/blog/how-will-russia-s-war-with-ukraine-end-here-are-5-possible-outcomes-60094602-7656-4808-8abb-0a68ee4d7aaf and constructive dialogue is expected to improve relations between states," the Ukrainian president's office said on its official channel on the Telegram messaging app alongside a photo of Mr Szijjarto, Mr Kuleba and Mr Yermak. Mr Szijarto will be in the western Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba and presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak. Peter Szijjarto has arrived in Ukraine for talks with senior officials today.





Still, it’s an open question whether the U.S. will be able to indefinitely continue its current level of support, said Mark Cancian, a CSIS senior adviser who has studied the volumes of artillery used in the war. Also in the mix is a pledge from France to ship AMX-10 RC light, wheeled tanks. And its use carries with it the risk, again, of even greater involvement in the war by the U.S. But it could also, at least temporarily, halt the advance of the Ukrainian Army.











  • But it was a reminder that Russian doctrine allows for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield.








  • But Russia under Putin has never ended its wars at the negotiating table; at best it has frozen them, keeping its options open.








  • Even if there was a sudden interest in peace negotiations these could well be played for time and propaganda effect without much expectation that they would lead to an agreement.








  • Like Stalin’s invasion of Finland in the Winter War of 1939, the Russian army is bogged down and bloodied by a much smaller, outgunned enemy.










That said, there wasn't much of a political will for third countries to sanction Cuba at the time. It's possible today's situation with Russia might make such a policy more politically palatable if the U.S. attempted it again, though I can't find any serious proposal in the government to do just that. It is theoretically possible for the U.S. to sanction countries that maintain economic ties with Russia.











  • But the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Celeste Wallander, warned at the hearing that the current funding level “does not preclude” the administration from needing to request more assistance before the end of September.








  • To be sure, a lot happened in the intervening years that could have changed the direction of what followed.








  • Finally, there remains the specter that a desperate Kremlin might escalate the war, such as by direct attacks on supply and training bases in nearby NATO countries or even limited use of nuclear weapons.








  • Mark Temnycky, a Ukrainian-American journalist and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center said that delays in 2023 allowed Russia to fortify positions in the south and east of Ukraine, regroup and re-strategize.










It could prove the best chance to achieve the victory that Ukraine and the democratic world need soon, while making it both Putin- and Trump-proof. Some Ukrainian experts fear a pincer movement to encircle Donbas and the east from Sumy in the north and Velyka Novosilka in the south, allowing Russia to occupy most of the four Ukrainian provinces it has unilaterally claimed to have annexed. At this point, Russia could call for a ceasefire to retain what it has, and run a defensive campaign to consolidate its battered military. Professor Mark Edele — Hansen Professor in History at the University of Melbourne and author of a new book, Russia's War Against Ukraine — says there are five possible outcomes to the war. According to Die Welt newspaper, for example, Germany promised 100 Leopard tanks and has delivered 10; promised 357 reconnaissance drones and delivered 27; promised 20 transport vehicles and delivered none. Now that Yevgeny Prigozhin is presumed to have died in a plane crash, the fate of his lucrative paramilitary group hangs in the balance.