The Biden Administration Is Quietly Shifting Its Strategy in Ukraine

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But it has not defined what it means, in this context, for the war to be “over.” Must there be a formal peace treaty? Must there be a period of months or years in which Russia does not fire a single shell into Ukraine? Tying Ukrainian NATO membership to such conditions would give Putin another incentive never to meet them.











  • In response, companies on both sides of the Atlantic announced plans to restart production lines for artillery shells and other weapons considered somewhat arcane until recently.








  • 24 territory as they can get, force Putin to the bargaining table, and then ultimately Ukraine would have to compromise somewhat on issues like Crimea and portions of the east and arrange for solid security guarantees going forward,” Smith told Defense News in a phone interview.








  • More than ever, the outcome depends on political decisions made miles away from the centre of the conflict - in Washington and in Brussels.








  • Resistance has already begun, with a nationwide call-up of men of fighting age and 18,000 automatic weapons being handed out to the citizens of Kyiv, in addition to the uniformed army and reserves who are already putting up stiff resistance.








  • Chancellor Olaf Scholz also recently authorized supplying infantry fighting vehicles to help push Russian forces out of occupied Ukraine.










The invaders’ key advantage is the number of troops available – about 300,000, almost all of whom are already committed to Ukraine. Still, it’s an open question whether the U.S. will be able to indefinitely continue its current level of support, said Mark Cancian, a CSIS senior adviser who has studied the volumes of artillery used in the war. “The ultimate end to this is the Ukrainians take back as much pre-Feb.



Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War



He said that “Ukraine will be fighting until it gains all its territory back.” But he also seemed to leave himself space for compromise. Talks with Russia, he said, could begin once it withdraws to the line of February 24th. This would bear similarities to the situation after the initial Russian incursions into Ukraine in 2014 – but this time the west would be left facing an implacable, large hostile actor in Moscow. Ukraine, meanwhile, would need years of western support to ensure its eastern border remains stable. Depending on how long the war lasts, it remains far from certain whether lawmakers will keep funding Ukraine aid packages.





"Three decades of peace is sadly not the norm. In dealing with a tyrant we need to escalate our planning." If Russia's invasion turns into a long-term occupation of Ukraine then it is conceivable that Western nations may well support a Ukrainian insurgency, just as the US supported the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. This is not without risk, as Putin is likely to retaliate in some form.



How — and when — Ukraine's war with Russia could end



Regardless of a country’s government style, a leader is still dependent upon the support of a group of people, or coalition, to stay in power. Vladimir Putin depends on oligarchs, the Russian mafia and the military for his survival. Although Putin attempted to build up a financial bulwark that would allow him to protect the interests of the oligarchs, the sanctions imposed by the west have undercut most of his efforts. The news from the battlefield, the diplomatic noises off, the emotion of the grieving and displaced; all of this can be overwhelming. So let us step back for a moment and consider how the conflict in Ukraine might play out. What are https://ambitious-camel-g3r4ks.mystrikingly.com/blog/win-lose-stalemate-or-a-shock-how-might-the-ukraine-war-end-ukraine-a875ebb2-29e8-4230-a7c0-e51aeb937cb8 of the possible scenarios that politicians and military planners are examining?











  • Despite Ukraine’s gains against Russia, experts believe a frozen conflict or painful truce is most likely.








  • Over 10 million have been forced to flee their homes, including over 6.3 million who have sought refuge outside Ukraine.








  • "His political life is not finished. He won't stay in exile in Belarus."








  • "In the short term," says Brig Ben Barry from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "a successful Russian seizure of Kyiv would be a military and political success with strategic impact.








  • That conflict, also between neighbours, was fundamentally fought over territory and resources.










Although for a while Prigozhin carried on with his affairs in Russia as if nothing untoward had happened, and even at one point met with his old chum Putin again, it was hard to believe that he would survive such a challenge and so it proved. And that has direct consequences for the future of the war in Ukraine. But to analysts, like Morris, the prospect of Putin being removed is extremely unlikely — and the chances that whoever replaces him will be less hawkish are even more remote. “There isn’t really any source of alternative power to coalesce around while Putin is healthy and alive,” said Morris. “Essentially once the West made a decision that Ukraine is important … it had to support them to the end, and that means the Ukrainians are the ones who will decide when they’re going to stop,” he said. The US and its allies were quick to provide aid that has been vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.





Ranged against them stand mainly Poland and the Baltic states, championed by Britain. Pressure would then grow on Kyiv to negotiate – not necessarily from the west, but perhaps led by China. However, Ukraine would be highly unlikely to formally cede any territory, given popular support for resistance to the Russian invasion. Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring counteroffensive makes incremental or even no progress in the spring and summer, partly because the west has failed to supply it with enough weaponry. The result is a protracted struggle that gradually lessens in intensity as the Russians run short on ammunition and resupply to Ukraine eases.











  • One problem is it leads to playing down the benefits the US has always got in its conventional operations from superior firepower.








  • Yet six months on Putin does not give the appearance of having suffered long-term harm.








  • Putin would ideally like to see the Zelensky government quickly capitulate and surrender, to be replaced by a Moscow-leaning puppet government.










The White House and Pentagon publicly insist there is no official change in administration policy — that they still support Ukraine’s aim of forcing Russia’s military completely out of the country. This effort has also involved bolstering air defense systems and building fortifications, razor wire obstructions and anti-tank obstacles and ditches along Ukraine’s northern border with Belarus, these officials say. In addition, the Biden administration is focused on rapidly resurrecting Ukraine’s own defense industry to supply the desperately needed weaponry the U.S.







There is no scope for anything but more war until the fortunes of those new Russian forces are settled on the battlefield. For 2023, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia's spring offensive. Putin had admitted that about 50,000 of the newly mobilised troops are already at the front; the other 250,000 of those just mobilised are training for next year.





Now, a collection of Western tank-type vehicles is slated to arrive on the front lines this spring, with training already underway in donor countries. The vehicles carry the hope of enabling battlefield wins for Ukrainian forces that will lead to some kind of war-ending scenario — if the weapons arrive in time. And even once Russian forces have achieved some presence in Ukraine's cities, perhaps they struggle to maintain control. Maybe Russia cannot provide enough troops to cover such a vast country. Ukraine's defensive forces transform into an effective insurgency, well-motivated and supported by local populations. And then, perhaps after many years, with maybe new leadership in Moscow, Russian forces eventually leave Ukraine, bowed and bloodied, just as their predecessors left Afghanistan in 1989 after a decade fighting Islamist insurgents.





Under Article 5 of the military alliance's charter, an attack on one member is an attack on all. But Mr Putin might take the risk if he felt it was the only way of saving his leadership. If he was, perhaps, facing defeat in Ukraine, he might be tempted to escalate further. We now know the Russian leader is willing to break long-standing international norms. This week, Mr Putin put his nuclear forces on a higher level of alert. But it was a reminder that Russian doctrine allows for the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield.